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ABSTRACT
Secure distance bounding (DB) protocols allow one entity,
the verifier, to securely obtain an upper-bound on the dis-
tance to another entity, the prover. Thus far, DB was con-
sidered mostly in the context of a single prover and a single
verifier. There has been no substantial prior work on se-
cure DB in group settings, where a set of provers interact
with a set of verifiers. The need for group distance bounding
(GDB) is motivated by many practical scenarios, including:
group device pairing, location-based access control and se-
cure distributed localization. GDB is also useful in mission-
critical networks and automotive computer systems. This
paper addresses, for the first time, GDB protocols by uti-
lizing the new passive DB primitive and the novel mutual
multi-party GDB protocol. We show how they can be used
to construct secure and efficient GDB protocols for various
settings. We analyze security and performance of our pro-
tocols and compare them with existing DB techniques when
applied to group settings.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks – especially, sensor and mobile ad-hoc
networks, have become increasingly popular. Enabled by
pervasive availability of location information, new wireless
scenarios have emerged where accurate proximity informa-
tion is essential to both applications and basic networking
functions. Such scenarios require secure, reliable and effi-
cient verification of distances between nodes, in addition to
node authentication. Distance Bounding (DB) can address
such scenarios by allowing one entity (verifier) to obtain
an upper-bound on the distance to another entity (prover)
and, optionally, authenticate the latter. DB was introduced
by Brands and Chaum [4] as a means of preventing the so-
called “mafia fraud” attacks on bank ATMs1. In Brands and
Chaum’s DB approach, a user’s smart-card (verifier) checks
its proximity to the ATM (prover). DB has been recently
implemented [19] using commercial off-the-shelf electron-
ics (resulting in 15cm accuracy). It was also suggested and
implemented as a means of securely determining node loca-
1A “mafia fraud” attack occurs when the attacker identifies itself to
the verifier using the identity of a prover, without the latter being
aware (i.e., man-in-the-middle attack).
tions in wireless networks [14, 6, 8, 23].
In most prior work, DB was considered in the context of a
single prover and a single verifier. Group Distance Bounding
(GDB) is the natural extension of the DB concept to group
settings with multiple provers and verifiers. Multiple veri-
fiers provide several advantages including: higher attack re-
silience and improved availability (by avoiding a single point
of compromise or failure), in addition to facilitating localiza-
tion using multilateration. The common goal in applications
that require GDB is: several devices must securely measure
distances between themselves or should only operate in the
vicinity of each other.
GDB is motivated by the following emerging wireless ap-
plications: group device pairing – a procedure for setting up
an initial secure channel among a group of previously unfa-
miliar wireless devices. There are several scenarios where
this is required, e.g., when an ephemeral ad-hoc group of
users meet. Each user has a personal wireless device that
must establish a secure channel with devices of other users.
One concrete example using cell-phones is described in [11].
Another scenario is that of a single user with multiple de-
vices, e.g, in a home area network [5]. A secure mechanism
is required to ensure that the group of communicating de-
vices is clustered within a particular area, i.e., each device is
within a certain distance from every other device. The mu-
tual multi-party GDB protocol (Section 3.3) achieves this.
Another application that can benefit from GDB is auto-
motive computer systems. Recent research [10] pointed out
vulnerability of such systems to attacks through wireless in-
terfaces (demonstrated in [3] using relay attacks). As more
components of such systems communicate wirelessly, it be-
comes critical to ensure that the origin of communication
is from within the car to prevent relay attacks. Ensuring
that such components only communicate with each other
prevents attacks through unauthorized or outside malicious
components. The mutual multi-party GDB protocol (Section
3.3) achieves this.
GDB is also useful in critical, e.g., military, MANETs
where a key operational requirement is to track locations of,
and authenticate, friendly nodes [2]. Critical MANETs gen-
erally operate without any infrastructure and in hostile en-
vironments where node compromise is quite realistic. GDB
1
can be used to implement location based-access control and
location-based group key management in critical MANETs.
Both mutual multi-party GDB (Section 3.3) and passive DB
(Section 3.1) can be used in such settings.
In this paper, we show that a straightforward extension
of previous single prover single verifier DB to GDB is in-
efficient and insecure if used for localization without syn-
chronization between verifiers (which was also pointed out
in [8]). We explore and propose more efficient and secure
GDB approaches. We make the following contributions:
- Definition of Group Distance Bounding (GDB)
- New primitives: Passive DB and Mutual Multi-Party GDB
- A set of secure and efficient GDB protocols
- Security and performance analysis of proposed protocols
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we overview
traditional DB protocols, formulate the GDB problem and
state our system and adversary models in Section 2. We
present details and security analysis of our GDB building
block primitives in Section 3. We then show how to use
these building blocks to construct GDB protocols in both
one-way and mutual GDB settings in Section 4. We ana-
lyze performance and security of GDB protocols in Section
5. We discuss related work in Section 6 and conclude with
open issues and future work in Section 7.
2. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATE-
MENT
We begin with an overview of DB protocols, followed by
the problem statement and system model.
2.1 Overview of Distance Bounding (DB)
Figure 1 shows the generic DB protocol operation. The
core of any one-way DB protocol is the distance measure-
ment phase, whereby the verifier measures round-trip time
between sending its challenge and receiving the reply from
the prover. Verifier’s challenges are unpredictable to the
prover and replies are computed as a function of these chal-
lenges. Thus, the prover cannot reply to the verifier before
receiving its challenges. The prover, therefore, cannot pre-
tend to be closer to the verifier than it really is (only further).
First, the verifier and the prover each generate n b-bit nonces
ci and ri (1 ≤ i ≤ n), respectively. In the Brands-Chaum
DB protocol [4], the prover also commits to its nonces (us-
ing any secure commitment scheme). The verifier sends all
ci to the prover, one at a time. Once each ci is received, the
prover computes, and responds with a function of its own
nonce and that of the verifier, f(ci, ri). The verifier checks
the reply and measures the elapsed time between each chal-
lenge and response. The process is repeated n times and the
protocol completes successfully only if all n rounds succeed
and all responses correspond to prover’s committed value.
The processing time on the prover’s side α = tPs − tPr must
be negligible (compared to the time of flight); otherwise, a
computationally powerful prover could claim a false bound.
This time might be tolerably small, depending on the un-
Figure 1: Basic DB Operation.
derlying technology, the distance measured and the required
security guarantees (less than 1nsec processing time yields
0.15m accuracy [19]).
Security of DB protocols relies on two assumptions: (1)
challenges are random, and unpredictable to the prover be-
fore being sent by the verifier, and (2) challenges traverse
the distance between the prover and the verifier at maximum
possible speed. i.e., the speed of electromagnetic waves. Af-
ter executing a DB protocol, the verifier knows that distance
to the prover is at most t
V
r −t
V
s −α
2 · c, where α is the process-
ing time of prover (ideally, negligible) and c the speed of
light [4]. DB protocols typically require (2n+ C) messages,
where C is the number of messages exchanged in the pre-
and post-processing protocol phases. Typically, C << n
and thus can be ignored.
In some cases (e.g., distributed localization), there is a
need for mutual DB between two parties: P1 and P2. This
can be achieved by modifying the one-way DB protocol such
that each response from P2 to a challenge by P1 also in-
cludes a challenge from P2 to P1. This requires 2n+2C+1
messages instead of 2(2n+ C) for mutual DB and is shown
in [25]. Both parties generate and commit to two random bit
strings [c1, c2, ..., cn] and [s1, s2, ..., sn]. P1 starts by send-
ing the first challenge bit c1 and P2 replies with c1 ⊕ s1. P1
measures the time between sending c1 and receiving the re-
sponse. P1 then replies with c2 ⊕ s1. P2 measures the time
between sending c1 ⊕ s1 and receiving the response. This
process is repeated n times. The mutual DB procedure is
considered successful if both parties verify all responses and
match previously committed values (see [25] for more de-
tails). We take advantage of this optimization in constructing
mutual GDB protocols.
If prover authentication is required, public key signatures
can be used to sign challenges and responses. The verifier
validates the signature in the last step, as shown in Figure 1.
The protocol succeeds only if the signature is valid. Public
key identification schemes (e.g., Schnorr or Fiat-Shamir) can
also be used as described in [4].
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Figure 2: Group Distance Bounding Variants.
2.2 Problem Statement and System Model
We first present the general GDB problem statement and
its variants, then describe our system and adversary models.
Problem Statement: In general, GDB involves one or more
provers interacting with one or more verifiers. The goal
of verifiers is to accurately and securely establish distance
bounds (DBs) to provers and, optionally, authenticate them.
Provers are generally untrusted, i.e., they may behave ma-
liciously by reporting false distances and identities. Each
device can be a prover, a verifier or both, i.e., we take into
account both one-way and mutual DB. We consider three
GDB cases (see also Figure 2):
1- MPNV: N verifiers establish DBs to M provers.
2- 1PNV: N verifiers establish DBs to a single prover.
3- MP1V: A single verifier establishes DBs to M provers.
In mutual GDB, the two special cases (1PNV and MP1V )
are equivalent and are called (1-to-M). In addition, there is
a case where N peer nodes are required to establish mutual
DB with each other; we call it mutual multi-party GDB.
System Model: We make the following assumptions:
- Coverage: All devices are within each others’ transmission
range. This is a common assumption in all DB literature,
e.g., [4, 14, 23, 21, 18, 24].
- Accuracy: Each device can implement distance bounding,
i.e., is capable of fast and accurate processing - on the order
of nanoseconds2.
- Keys: Each device has a public/private key pair and a cer-
tificate binding the public key to its identity. (Applies only
if authentication is required).
- Collusion: Colluding provers do not reveal their secret keys
to each other. (Applies only if authentication is required).
- Interaction between Verifiers: In one-way GDB, verifiers
know each others’ locations or distances separating them.
This is not required in mutual GDB.
Adversary Model: We assume that the adversary is compu-
tationally bounded and can not prevent nodes within its radio
range from receiving its transmissions (i.e., not using direc-
tional antennas). In one-way GDB, the adversary can only
compromise provers. Verifiers trust each other in one-way
GDB. In mutual GDB, all nodes are treated equally with no
trust assumptions. Our adversary model covers the follow-
ing attacks in one-way GDB settings (based on attacks in
one-way DB [4]):
1- Distance Fraud Attack: A dishonest prover claims
2 Possible using off-the-shelf electronics as in [19] or using UWB
ranging platforms e.g.[1, 14].
DB(s) Distance Bound(s)
P Prover
V (Va, Vp) Verifier (subscript denotes active or passive)
DBx,y DB established by verifier x on prover y
tx,y Time of flight between nodes x and y
dx,y Distance between nodes x and y (dx,y = dy,x)
n (na, np) Number of DB rounds (subscript denotes active or passive)
da Fraction of verifiers performing na active rounds
H( ) Cryptographically secure hash function
Prch(X) Fraction of DB rounds in which node X cheats
Table 1: Notation.
to be closer than it really is. (Note that a prover can al-
ways claim to be further by delaying responses.) The goal of
this attack in one-way GDB is to shorten the distance from
the malicious prover to one or more (or even all) verifiers.
2- Mafia Fraud Attack: A form of a man-in-the-middle
(MiTM) attack. The adversary, who is close to the verifier,
interacts with it, while posing as the prover. In parallel, it
interacts with the prover posing as the verifier. The goal is to
fool the verifier into believing that the adversary is the prover
located closer to the verifier than the actual prover. In one-
way GDB, we consider a version of this attack where the
adversary places one or more nodes between the prover(s)
and one or more verifiers. The adversary aims to convince
verifiers that these intermediate nodes are real provers which
are located closer to them than actual provers.
We consider the following attacks in mutual GDB settings:
1- Passive Distance Fraud Attack: In mutual GDB with
one group of N nodes, each node has to establish N − 1
DBs. We assume that the adversary can compromise at most
N −2 nodes. The goal of this attack is for two (or more) un-
compromised nodes to establish incorrect DBs to each other.
2- Node Insertion Attack: The adversary inserts one or
more fake nodes into the group. It succeeds if other “hon-
est” nodes in the group accept such fake nodes as legitimate
group members and establish DBs to them. Such DB should
also be shorter than the real distance to these fake nodes.
3. GDB BUILDING BLOCKS
We first introduce a new building block primitive for con-
structing secure and efficient GDB protocols, one-way pas-
sive DB. We then consider an optimization to decrease num-
ber of messages in GDB protocols, interleaved one-to-many
mutual DB. By combining the two we construct the novel
mutual multi-party GDB protocol. In mutual multi-party
GDB each node, in a group of N nodes, engages in a se-
cure mutual DB protocol with its (N − 1) peers. Notation
used in this paper is reflected in Table 1.
3.1 One-Way Passive DB
Whenever a prover and a verifier engage in a DB protocol,
some information about their locations and mutual distance
is leaked [18]. We use this observation in the presence of
multiple verifiers. We show that it is unnecessary for every
verifier to directly interact with the prover (P ) to establish
3
Figure 3: Messages Observed by Passive Verifier.
a DB. If at least one active verifier (Va) interacts with P ,
any other passive verifier (Vp) can deduce the DB between
itself and P by observing messages between P and Va. We
assume that Vp and Va trust each other, know the distance
separating them (or each other’s locations) and are both re-
quired to establish a DB to P . We address passive DB with
untrusted verifiers in Section 5.3.
Figure 3 shows how Vp observes timings (Ti) of messages
exchanged in a DB protocol between P and Va. Vp can con-
struct the following equations:
T1 = t0 + tVa,Vp (1)
T2 = t0 + tVa,P + αp + tP,Vp (2)
T3 = t0 + 2 · tVa,P + αP + αVa + tVa,Vp (3)
where αP and αVa are processing times of P and Va, re-
spectively (ideally αP is equal to zero) and t0 is the protocol
starting time. Vp can determine time of flight for signals be-
tween P and Va thus computing the distance between them:
dVa,P = c · tVa,P = c ·
(T3 − T1)− αP − αVa
2
(4)
Where c denotes speed of light. For Va (and Vp) to measure
the distance between itself and P , αP must be negligible (or
constant) and known3.
Overview of establishing a passive DB: Vp uses time dif-
ference of arrival (TDoA) of three messages, its own loca-
tion and Va’s location to construct the locus of P ’s possi-
ble locations (a hyperbola similar to other TDoA techniques
[12]). Vp then determines the distance between Va and P (as
shown in Equation 4) and constructs a circle with a radius
equal to that distance. This circle intersects with P ’s loca-
tion locus at two points (s1 and s2). Vp computes DB to P
as the distance between itself and s1 (or s2)4.
Details of establishing a passive DB: We now demon-
strate the details of the procedure. We also show that if P
manages to cheat and shorten the passive DB established by
Vp, then the active DB established by Va must also be short-
ened. Since the DB established by Va can not be shortened,
3Common assumption in DB literature, e.g., [4, 14, 23, 21, 18, 24].
4If Vp does not know Va’s exact location but only the distance to
Va, then, instead of a sector of a circle, Vp obtains an area between
two circles with radii corresponding to furthest and closest points
to Vp on the hyperbola. In that case the larger radius will be used
as a DB to P .
a passive DB is as secure as the active DB established be-
tween Va and P . Suppose Va is located at (xa, ya) and Vp is
at (xp, yp). Vp knows its own location and that of Va (hence
the distance dVa,Vp ). Without loss of generality we assume
(xa, ya) = (0, 0) to be the origin of a coordinate system. It
follows that:
dVa,Vp =
√
(xp − xa)2 + (yp − ya)2 =
√
(xp)2 + (yp)2
(5)
We further assume that P is at (x, y). Vp also knows that:
dVp,P =
√
(x− xp)2 + (y − yp)2 =
√
(x)2 + (dVa,Vp − y)
2
(6)
dVa,P =
√
(x− xa)2 + (y − ya)2 =
√
(x)2 + (y)2 (7)
If three messages as in Figure 3 are received at times:
T1, T2 and T3, respectively, Vp computes dVa,P as shown
in Equations 4. Vp also computes:
c · (T2−T1) = c ·δ1 = dVa,P +c ·αP +dP,Vp−dVa,Vp (8)
Where c is speed of light. However, since dVa,P (Equations
4) and dVa,Vp (verifiers know distances between them) are
known, Vp obtains:
Γ = c · (δ1 − αP ) + dVa,Vp = dVa,P + dVp,P =√
(x)2 + (y)2 +
√
(x)2 + (dVa,Vp − y)
2 (9)
Which yields the following formula for the locus of P ’s
possible location (which lies on a hyperbola due to TDoA
[12]):
y =
dVa,Vp
√
(d2Va,Vp − Γ
2)± Γ ·
√
(4x2 + d2Va,Vp − Γ
2)
2
√
(d2Va,Vp − Γ
2)
(10)
Note that DBVa,P = dVa,P is an upper bound on the dis-
tance between P and Va. Using dVa,P , Vp can construct an-
other equation for the locus of P ’s possible location (a circle
around Va with radius dVa,P ):
(x − xa)
2 + (y − ya)
2 = (dVa,P )
2 (11)
Vp can now establish a passive DB using the intersection
of both loci (i.e., solving both equations 11 and 10). This
DB is the distance between Vp’s own location (xp, yp) and
the intersection of P’s loci described by equations 11 and
10. This DB (DBVp,P = dVp,P ) will only be in a sector of a
circle, not in the entire circle as in the case of an active DB.
Substituting x = xa+
√
(dVa,P )
2 − (y − ya)2 (from equa-
tion 11) into equation 10, the y-coordinate of P ’s location
becomes: y ∝ (dVa,P ) (same for P ’s x-coordinate). For Vp
to compute a wrong (shorter) DB to P , it has to have com-
puted a shorter dVa,P . A shorter dVa,P requires DBVa,P to
have been computed shorter than the actual distance between
P and Va (which is not possible as shown in Section 2.1).
To better illustrate this, Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show an
example scenario. P (labeled Actual Prover in Figures) at
4
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Figure 4: Establishing a Correct and Incorrect Passive DB.
(−7,−7) is on one of several possible hyperbolas. The DB
from Va at (0, 0) to P is shown as a circle around Va (labeled
as Active Verifier in Figures). If P somehow cheats so that
the passive DB is shorter, then this would require that the
circle drawn around Vp at (0, 10) intersects the hyperbola at
a point ((−3,−1.5) in Figure 4(b)) close to Vp. This point
will be inside the circle established by Va. If this is the case
then the DB computed by Va has to be shorter than the actual
distance to P which is not possible. If Vp actively engages in
a DB protocol with Va, it would get the circle shown around
it in Figure 4(a). However, in this passive case, it gets a sec-
tor of that circle, which is the arc connecting the two points
((−7,−7) and (7,−7)) where the computed hyperbola inter-
sects the circle around the active verifier. We have shown in
Section 2.1 how active DB prevents the distance fraud attack.
Since passive DB is as secure as active DB, it will prevent
the distance fraud attack. Adding authentication to passive
DB prevents the mafia-fraud attack because an attacker will
not be able to authenticate itself to a passive verifier unless it
also does to an active one. A passive verifier can utilize the
same authentication mechanism as an active verifier. Active
verifiers can use public key signatures (or public key iden-
tification schemes) to authenticate provers, as described in
Section 2.1. All necessary information (commitment, chal-
lenges, responses and signatures) required to authenticate
provers also reach passive verifiers. The only disadvantage
is that a passive verifier does not send its own challenges.
Passive DB remains secure because it assumes trusted active
verifiers. If that is not the case, mutual one-to-many DB or
mutual multi-party GDB can be used.
3.2 Interleaved One-to-Many Mutual DB
When one node engages in mutual DB withM other nodes,
one-to-many mutual DB, the number of required messages
can be reduced by interleaving challenges and responses to
different nodes. We label the “one” node in this case the ini-
tiator (Pi) and the other “many” nodes (M) the “participants”
(Pj , j ∈ {1, ...,M}). Pi performs mutual DB with each Pj ;
however, the last message of the interaction with one Pj is
used as the first challenge of the interaction with Pj+1. This
process can be generalized for M parties, one initiator and n
rounds, resulting in a protocol with n · (2M + 1) messages.
This would have required n · (4M) or n · (3M) messages if
pairwise single prover single verifier DB or interleaved sin-
gle prover single verifier DB were used respectively.
3.3 Mutual Multi-Party GDB
The obvious approach to establish mutual DBs between
every pair of nodes, in a group of N nodes, is to perform
it sequentially between each pair. This requires 2n · N ·
(N − 1) messages and is insecure. A malicious node, act-
ing as a prover, can selectively delay messages to another
specific node acting as a verifier. This yields a larger DB,
to that node only, and results in false localizations if multi-
lateration is used as shown in [8]. One can interleave chal-
lenges and responses to reduce the number of messages to
(2n+1)·N ·(N−1)
2 , but selective delaying of responses will still
be possible. Our protocol, mutual multi-party GDB, relies
on the broadcast nature of the wireless channel and takes ad-
vantage of message overhearing and appropriate timing of
challenges and responses. All nodes simultaneously engage
in the same protocol. The protocol combines passive DB and
interleaving of challenges and responses (similar to Section
3.2) to reduce message complexity from O(N2) to O(N)
without sacrificing security.
We begin with a simple four-node example, shown in Fig-
ure 5. Each node (k) first generate n random bit strings
(bi,k), each of length l. Each node broadcasts a commitment
to these bit strings. These commitments are hashed and used
by nodes to order themselves in a logical ring. This ordering
determines the sequence in which nodes send and respond
to challenges. In Figure 5 nodes order themselves clock-
wise starting from P1 to P4. P1 starts and sends the first
of its generated bits strings (b1,1) as a challenge to its left
logical neighbor P2 (message 1). P2 computes and sends
the reply (rp2,1) to P1 using its own first bit string (b1,2)
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and the challenge bit string (b1,1) received from P1, i.e.,
message 2 is rp2,1 = b1,1 ⊕ b1,2. P3 uses the reply from
P2 to P1 as a challenge and computes its own reply to P2
(rp3,2 = b1,3 ⊕ rp2,1) and broadcasts it as message 3. P4
uses this reply (rp3,2) as a challenge from P3 and computes
its own reply (rp4,3 = b1,4 ⊕ rp3,2) and sends it to P1 as
message 4. P1 then replies to P4 with message 5 containing
rp1,4 = b2,1⊕ rp4,3. The process is repeated again counter-
clock wise but using the second bit string. All challenges
and responses are broadcast and all nodes receive and record
them. Nodes only respond to challenges from their imme-
diate logical neighbors. Once a node computes all required
DBs, it broadcasts them with a hash of all received chal-
lenges and responses (and optionally signs them if authen-
tication is required). This will require four additional mes-
sages. We note here that each node independently computes
DBs to other nodes based on linear equations constructed
from the reception times as illustrated in Linear equations
can be solved with standard automated methods, e.g., Gauss
elimination or Gauss-Jordan elimination. Table 2. Nodes
do not rely on any reported measurements from other nodes,
hence the same model of distrusting a node acting as a prover
as in the original DB protocol holds.
Any mutual DB protocol for four nodes will require four
commit (and four de-commit) messages which are not shown
in Figure 5. The main difference is in number of messages
in the rapid bit exchange phase. In Figure 5 a total of 8 mes-
sages are required in that phase, in the case of sequential
pairwise DB 24 will be needed and 18 in case of sequential
DB with interleaving. The process can be generalized to the
case of N nodes. The total number of messages for the gen-
eral case of N nodes and n rounds in the rapid bit exchange
phase is5: n · (2N). Additionally, 2N messages are required
for the commitments and decommitments to make sure that
every node has used the random bits it generated and has
computed DBs correctly.
Security: The mutual multi-party GDB protocol is secure
against distance-fraud and passive distance fraud attacks as
long as the group contains at least two honest neighboring
nodes (in the logical ring). A malicious node launching any
attacks will be detected by these two (or more) honest neigh-
bors because the active DB between them can not be influ-
enced by any other node. When immediate neighbors of a
node exchange messages with their own neighbors, that node
establishes passive DBs on these two-hop neighbors. These
DBs are established passively and can not be affected by any
other node because, as we have shown, passive DB is as se-
5This can be derived by analyzing the construction of linear equa-
tions from observing messages. Any node can construct 2N − 2
independent equations from time of arrival of 2N consecutive mes-
sages (as each node sends two messages). These equations have
2N − 2 unknowns, N unknowns for time of flight between pairs
of neighboring nodes and N − 3 between the observing node and
every other node (see in Figure 6). There’s an additional unknown,
the variable t0, corresponding protocol starting time. These equa-
tions can be solved resulting in a unique solution.
Figure 5: Mutual Multi-Party GDB Example
Figure 6: Breaking down Mutual Multi-party GDB into
Passive DBs.
cure as active DB. This process is repeated until all DBs are
established. The example in Figure 6 shows how node P1
uses interactions between different nodes in the group to es-
tablish a DB on each of them. P1 establishes DB directly
with its neighbors P2 and P6, it then uses the messages ex-
changed between P2 and P3 to establish a passive DB on P3
and those between P3 and P4 to DB P4 and between P4 and
P5 to DB P5. This process is carried out by each node in-
dependently during the protocol at different times resulting
in secure DBs established to other nodes. The description
of Figure 6 is simplified to convey the intuition. In real-
ity, when solving linear equations constructed from TDoA
of messages, several equations resulting from different inter-
actions will be used in computing each DB to a non neighbor
(details are shown in Table 2). For example, in Table 2, P1
uses equations of T7, T3 and T9 to DB P3, as opposed to T3
only as in the simplified explanation (Figure 6).
To demonstrate how attacks can be detected consider how
each node computes DBs from the arrival times of messages
as shown in Table 2. Assuming P1, P2 and P4 are honest
and P3 is malicious. P3 can launch attacks by delaying its
messages (number 3 and 7) by δ1 and δ2 respectively. This
attack will be detected because DBP1,P2 computed by P1,
and that computed by P2 will not be the same. This will be
detected when nodes broadcast their computed DBs at the
end of the protocol. P1 will compute DBP1,P2 = T2/2 =
tP1,P2 (from message 2 in the column for P1), whereas P2
will compute DBP1,P2 = T5 − tP2,P3 − tP3,P4 − tP1,P4 =
tP1,P2 − (δ1 +
δ2
2 ) (from messages 5 and 3 and steps (a) and
(b) in the last row of the column for P2). A similar detection
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Msg Participant 1 (P1) Participant 2 (P2) Participant 3 (P3) Participant 4 (P4)
1 Sender T1 = t0 + tP1,P2 T1 = t0 + tP1,P3 T1 = t0 + tP1,P4
2 T2 = 2tP1,P2 → DBP1,P2 Sender T2 = t0 + tP1,P2 + tP2,P4 + tP2,P3 T2 = t0 + tP1,P2
3 T3 = tP1,P2 + tP2,P3 + tP3,P1 T3 = 2tP2,P3 → DBP2,P3 Sender T3 = t0 + tP1,P2 + tP2,P3 + tP3,P4
4 T4 = tP1,P2 + tP2,P3 + tP3,P4 T4 = tP2,P3 + tP3,P4 + tP2,P4 T4 = 2tP3,P4 → DBP3,P4 Sender
+tP4,P1
5 Sender T5 = tP2,P3 + tP3,P4 T5 = tP3,P4 T5 = 2tP4,P1 → DBP4,P1
+tP4,P1 + tP1,P2 +tP4,P1 + tP1,P3
6 T6 = 2tP1,P4 → DBP1,P4 T6 = tP2,P3 + tP3,P4 T6 = 2tP3,P4 + 2tP4,P1 Sender
+2tP4,P1 + tP4,P2
7 T7 = tP1,P4 + tP3,P4 T7 = 2tP2,P3 + 2tP3,P4 Sender T7 = 2tP4,P3 → DBP4,P3
+tP3,P1 +2tP4,P1
8 T8 = tP1,P4 + tP3,P4 Sender T8 = 2tP3,P2 → DBP3,P2 T8 = tP4,P3
+tP2,P3 + tP1,P2 +tP3,P2 + tP2,P4
(a) T7 + T3 − T4 = 2tP1,P3 (a) T6 − T4 = 2tP1,P4 (a) T6 − 2tP3,P4 = 2tP1,P4 (a) T8 + T2 − T3
→ DBP1,P3 (b) T7 − T3 + T4 − T6 (b) T5 − tP3,P4 = 2tP4,P2 → DBP4,P2
= 2tP3,P4 −tP1,P4 = 2tP1,P3(c) T6 − tP2,P3 − tP3,P4 → DBP1,P3
−2tP1,P4 = tP2,P4 → DBP2,P4(d) T5 − tP2,P3 − tP3,P4
−tP1,P4 = tP1,P2 → DBP2,P1
Table 2: Message Reception Times and Constructed Equations in the Mutual Multi-Party GDB Protocol for Figure
5 (ti,j = tj,i, tx,y → DBx,y means that DBx,y can be directly computed from tx,y, the last row shows additional
computation required to establish the DBs).
will occur between P2 and P4 but based on DBP2,P4 . Even
if P3 and P4 are both malicious and colluding, the attack
will be detected because DBP1,P2 computed by P2 will be
DBP1,P2 = tP1,P2 −
δ2
2 (assuming P3 delays its messages
by δ1 and δ2 respectively, whereas P4 delays its message by
δ3 and δ4). Variations in computed DBs can be detected if at
least two honest nodes are neighbors in the constructed ring.
Node authentication in this protocol can be achieved using
traditional public key signatures. Each node initially broad-
casts its public key certificate in the commitment phase. Once
all (2nN ) protocol rounds are completed, each node hashes
all exchanged challenges and responses and signs the result-
ing hash. Recall that all nodes receive all challenges and
responses due to wireless broadcast. All signatures are then
broadcasted and each node verifies N − 1 signatures. All
nodes are authentic if all signatures verify successfully.
4. DB EXTENDED TO GROUP SETTINGS
We now show how to construct protocols for the two most
general GDB cases: (1) M provers and N verifiers (MPNV)
in one-way GDB, and (2) NtoM in mutual GDB. All other
cases can be obtained by setting the values of N and M as
desired. For comparison, we consider a basic GDB proto-
col where nodes sequentially engage in a naı´ve single prover
single verifier (mutual) DB. In each case we propose an al-
ternative approach based on passive DB, mutual multi-party
GDB or one-to-many mutual DB. We assume that n rounds
of DB are required in all cases.
4.1 One-Way MPNV GDB
In this case nodes either act as provers or as verifiers.
The goal at the end of the protocol is for all N verifiers
to have DBs to all M provers. In a naive MPNV proto-
col, each prover interacts sequentially in n rounds of DB
with each verifier. This is repeated until all provers have
interacted with all verifiers. The total number of messages
is: (2n · N · M). When constructing a protocol for this
group setting based on passive DB there are two parameters
to consider: (1) the number of active and passive DB rounds
performed by each verifier and (2) how the active verifiers
are selected (i.e., deterministic or probabilistic). The second
parameter does not affect the challenges and responses and
how every node performs DB but has an effect on the se-
curity if verifiers are compromised (discussed in Section 5).
Active verifiers can be selected randomly or by any leader
election protocol (e.g., [16]), the rest will be passive veri-
fiers. Other strategies could be explored but are out of scope
of this paper. The number of active verifiers, active rounds
and how many perform passive rounds affects the number of
messages required, the time needed for completing the pro-
cess and the security of the DB. If all verifiers are treated
equally two parameters can be used to describe a general
protocol: (1) the number of active verifiers and (2) the num-
ber of active rounds by each verifier. If each of the N veri-
fiers is required to perform n rounds of DB, we call the num-
ber of active rounds na (and passive rounds np = n − na).
We denote with da the fraction of verifiers which perform
na active rounds. The remaining verifiers perform passive
rounds. Each verifier will have (da · (N − 1) · na) oppor-
tunities to execute passive DB with each of the M provers.
Two interesting cases are obtained by setting da = 1/N and
na = n, only one verifier interacts actively with all provers,
and by setting da = 1 and na = n/N all verifiers interact
equally with all provers. By varying these two parameters
(na and da) one can obtain a protocol with the required se-
curity level and less messages than sequential pairwise inter-
action (performance and security analysis in Section 5).
4.2 Mutual NtoM GDB
In the general case of NtoM mutual DB there are two
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Setting Base Case Our Protocol
Number of Messages Number of Messages
MPNV 2n ·N ·M (2na + 1) · (N · da) ·M
1PNV (2n+ 1) ·N (2na + 1) ·N · da
MP1V (2n+ 1) ·M 2n+
∑M−1
j=1 (j + 1)
·(n− ((M − 1)− j))
1toM 4n ·M n · (2M + 1)
NtoM 4n ·N ·M 2n · (N +M)
Table 3: Number of Messages in GDB Protocols.
groups, G1 and G2, of N and M nodes respectively. All
nodes in G1 are required to establish DBs to each of the
nodes in G2 and vice versa, i.e., there is a total of 2N ·M
(but N ·M unique) DBs to be established. There are three
approaches to construct GDB protocols for this setting: (1)
based on one-way passive DB, (2) mutual multi-party GDB
or (3) one-to-many mutual DB.
(1) NtoM Using Passive DB: A fraction (d1) of nodes in
G1, d1 · N , will establish na1 active and np1 passive DB
rounds with each of the M nodes in G2. The rest of the
(1 − d1)N nodes in G1 establish only passive rounds. This
step involves one-way DB so at the end only nodes in G1
will establish DBs to nodes in G2. Nodes in G2 are required
to perform a similar step where d2 ·M nodes establish na2
active and np2 passive rounds of DB with each of the N
nodes in G1. The rest of the (1 − d2)M nodes in G2 estab-
lish only passive rounds. After this step all nodes in G2 will
have established one-way DBs to nodes in G1. This proto-
col requires nodes in G1 to trust each other and know each
other’s locations or distances separating them (same forG2).
(2) NtoM Using Mutual Multi-Party GDB: All the nodes
in both groups can be regarded as one group of size N +M .
The N +M nodes can engage in a mutual multi-party GDB
protocol as shown in Section 3.3, i.e., the general case of the
example of Figure 5. Such a protocol will require 2n(N +
M) messages. At the end each node will have DBs to all the
N+M−1 other nodes. Some of these DBs are not required,
since we assumed that nodes in G1 (and G2) don’t perform
DB on other nodes in the same group.
(3) NtoM Using One-to-Many Mutual DB: Each of the N
nodes in G1 engages in a one-to-many mutual DB protocol
described in Section 3.2 with all M nodes in G2. This is a
one-to-many mutual DB, so all nodes in G2 will also estab-
lish a DB to each node in G1. The total number of messages
in such a protocol will be: nN · (2M + 1).
5. PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY ANAL-
YSIS
We first analyze performance of proposed GDB protocols.
We then consider security of active DB in group settings,
passive DB with untrusted verifiers and their combination.
Our GDB protocols either use mutual multi-party GDB or
a combination of passive and active DB. Their security can
be understood by analyzing the underlying mechanisms and
combinations thereof. Correctness and security of passive
DB and mutual multi-party GDB are analyzed in Sections
3.1 and 3.3 respectively.
5.1 Performance of GDB Protocols
Table 3 compares number of messages required in one-
way and mutual GDB protocols to the base case (running
pairwise DB between nodes). Table 4 shows total time re-
quired to compute all DBs. We compare against this base
case because there are no previous proposals for GDB. Our
NtoM protocol in both tables is based on mutual multi-
party GDB. Our proposals require fewer messages and de-
pend on the fraction of active verifiers and active rounds
performed. In the MPNV case, only (na · da) messages
are required, where na is the fraction of active rounds per-
formed by the fraction of active verifiers, da. Figure 7(c)
shows how the number of messages increases as a function
of the fraction of active rounds and active verifiers (M=10
provers and N=10 verifiers and n=10 DB rounds). Figure
7(d) shows how the number of messages varies with the
number of provers and verifiers (to illustrate this dependency
we assume that number of provers is the same as number of
verifiers, N = M , and that fraction of active rounds is equal
to fraction of active verifiers, na = da). In the case of 60
nodes (30 provers and 30 verifiers) if the fraction of active
verifiers and active rounds is reduced to 0.8, 33% of mes-
sages can be saved. Decreasing this fraction to 0.6 saves
more than 55% of messages. Similar savings are also attain-
able for lower and larger numbers of provers/verifiers.
5.2 Security of Active DB vs Mutual Multi-
Party GDB
The probability of a single prover successfully cheating
a single verifier decreases exponentially with the number of
DB rounds (n) in an active DB protocol. For n rounds a
prover has 2−n chance to successfully guess all challenge
bits and send responses ahead of time. This tricks the verifier
into measuring a shorter round trip time of flight6. A Veri-
fier in an active DB protocol does not have to trust any other
entity. In group settings where each pair of provers verifiers
engage in an active DB protocol, these security guarantees
still hold. However, active DB in group settings is insecure if
used for localization. When a prover actively interacts with
each verifier separately, it can selectively enlarge its distance
by delaying messages. Verifiers will incorrectly localize the
prover using such DBs. Secure-localization schemes must
always require at least three verifiers to interact with the
prover simultaneously. The mutual multi-party GDB proto-
col achieves this by design. In mutual multi-party GDB all
nodes participate simultaneously in the same protocol and
overhear each other’s messages. A node can not selectively
delay messages to other nodes, it can either delay them to all
nodes or none.
62−n is the probability for Brands-Chaum protocol [4], whereas
in some other protocols like Hancke-Kuhn [13], this probability is
(3/4)−n.
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Setting Base Case Time Our Protocol Time
MPNV 2n ·
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1 tVi,Pj (2na + 1) ·
∑da·N
j=1
∑M
k=1 tPk,Vj
1PNV 2n ·
∑
N
i=1 tP,Vi (2na + 1) ·
∑da·N
j=1 tP,Vj
MP1V 2n ·
∑j
i=1 tV,Pi , j ∈ 1,M (n ·max(tV,Pi )) +
∑M−1
i=1 tV,Pi
1toM 4n ·
∑
M
j=1 tPi,Pj 2n ·
∑M+1
j=1 tPj ,P(j+1)mod(M+1)
NtoM 4n
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1 tPi,Pj 2n · (N +M)max(tPi,Pj ),
∀i, j ∈ {1,M}
Table 4: Time Required in GDB Protocols.
5.3 Security of Passive DB with Untrusted Ac-
tive Verifiers
Passive DB with untrusted verifiers is mainly useful in
MANETs, where nodes continuously encounter new peers.
Passive DB is secure if the active verifier behaves honestly
and is trusted as shown in Section 3.1. This will be the case
in a fixed (or mobile) verification infrastructure with prior
security association, or under the control of one administra-
tive entity. A malicious active verifier can undermine secu-
rity of passive DB as follows:
(1) Reporting a Fake Location (or Distance): A passive
verifier requires the exact location or the distance to the ac-
tive one in order to be able to construct the DB as shown in
Section 3.1. The passive verifier will wrongfully compute
the hyperbola (in Equation 10), if the active verifier reports
an incorrect location or distance, leading to a wrong passive
DB.
(2) Sending Early Challenges: Even if the active verifier
reports its location or distance correctly, it can send new
challenges prematurely. This leads the passive verifier to be-
lieve that the prover is closer than it actually is (as shown in
Figure 3). Vp wrongfully computes the distance dVa,P inter-
secting incorrectly with the hyperbola (as shown in Figure
4(a)), and leading to a wrong DB.
An essential aspect of passive DB is implicit trust that
the active verifier is behaving honestly, i.e., not cheating by
performing either of the previous two attacks. We devise a
metric, the DB Correctness (DBC), to illustrate the effec-
tiveness of passive DB in the presence of such attacks. We
define DBC for n rounds of passive DB as follows:
DBC = 1− 2n·(Prch(Va)−1) (12)
where Prch(Va) is the fraction of rounds in which Va
cheats. Note that cheating in passive DB is different than
in active DB. In active DB, P is the one cheating, whereas
in passive DB we are concerned with the case where Va is
the one cheating. When Va does not cheat in any DB rounds,
Prch(Va) will be 0 and DBC = 1 − 2−n. When Va cheats
in all DB rounds Prch(Va) will be 1 and DBC = 0. The
average correctness (DBCavg) in a DB to a given prover,
obtained by a passive verifier, in the case of N active veri-
fiers (Va1 , Va2 ...VaN ,) (each engaging in n1, n2...nN rounds
of DB respectively) is computed as the average of individual
DBC for each verifier:
DBCavg =
N −
∑N
i=1 2
ni·(Prch(Va(i))−1)
N
(13)
Figure 7(a) shows how DBCavg is affected by varying
fraction of rounds in which active verifiers cheat (x-axis) and
the fraction of cheating active verifiers. In the case consid-
ered (10 verifiers and 10 DB rounds) even if 50% of the ac-
tive verifiers cheat in 50% of their rounds, the DB will be
established correctly over 98% of the time. As long as less
than half of the active verifiers cheat in less than 90% of their
rounds, the DB will be correct more than 70% of the time.
5.4 Combined Passive/Active DB Security
When a verifier performs na active rounds and np passive
rounds both can be combined to obtain a more stable DB.
We estimate the correctness in such a combined DB using
a metric (DBCa/p) as follows (note that both passive and
active rounds have to result in the same DB):
DBCa/p = 1− (2
−na ·
∑N
i=1 2
np(i)·(Prch(Va(i))−1)
N
) (14)
If all other active verifiers cheat in all their DB rounds,
DBCa/p becomes that of the active rounds performed by
a verifier only, i.e., 1 − (2−na). Otherwise the likelihood
of correctness of the established DB increases with any ad-
ditional passive rounds. Figure 7(b) shows how the DB is
affected by cheating of active verifiers during passive DB by
showing how DBCa/p changes. In the case considered (10
verifiers) even if only two rounds of active (na) DB are per-
formed and as long as the fraction of rounds being cheated
in is less than 1 correctness of the DB captured by DBCa/p
increases. Even if the probability of cheating in passive DB
rounds is as high as 0.5, DBCa/p will increase to over 0.95
if there are four or more opportunities to do passive DB.
6. RELATED WORK
DB was first proposed in [4] to enable a single verifier to
determine an upper-bound on the physical distance to a sin-
gle prover and authenticate it as summarized in Section 2.1.
Several optimizations and studies of DB were then consid-
ered. In particular, [18] studied information leakage in DB
protocols as a privacy problem that should be avoided. In
our work, we start from this observation to construct pas-
sive DB and the mutual multi-party GDB protocol. [25]
proposed a mutual DB protocol by interleaving challenges
and responses but also between a single prover and a single
verifier. [23], [21] and [6] investigated using DB protocols
for location verification and secure localization with three
verifiers. The setting in [23] is a special case of MPNV
with M = 1 and N = 3. [20] investigated the so-called
“in-region verification” and claimed that, for certain appli-
cations, such as sensor networks and location-based access
control, in-region verification is a better match than location
determination. [8] and [7] considered collusion attacks on
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Figure 7: (a) DBCavg (Equation 13) and (b) DBCa/p (Equation 14) vs Probability of Cheating in Rounds with Ten
Verifiers (N=10); (c) and (d) Number of Messages in Passive DB based MPNV Protocol
DB location verification protocols. Other work, such as [26]
looked at using time difference of arrival (TDoA) to deter-
mine location of transmitters. [26] proposed using TDoA in
the context of Ultra-Wideband (UWB). The work in [24, 14]
recently implemented the first RF based TDoA secure local-
ization system using commercial off-the-shelf UWB ranging
devices. DB was also studied in the context of ad-hoc net-
works (e.g., [25]), sensor network (e.g., [15] [6]) and RFID
(e.g., [9] [13]) applications. Finally, DB has been used to
develop secure proximity based access control protocols for
implementable medical devices in [17] and implemented us-
ing commercial off-the-shelf electronic components in [19].
To summarize, our work differs from prior results, since:
(1) we introduce for the first time passive DB and the mutual
multi-party GDB protocol which are more suitable for group
settings, (2) we consider general GDB cases with multiple
provers and multiple verifiers (in the one-way and mutual
DB settings), (3) we study a large spectrum of possible pro-
tocol designs and (4) consider node authentication in both
one-way and mutual GDB.
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper presents the first investigation of group dis-
tance bounding (GDB). GDB is a fundamental mechanism
for secure operation in wireless networks where verifying
distances between, or locations of, groups of nodes is re-
quired. We have shown how to construct protocols that are
more efficient and secure than applying existing DB tech-
niques in group settings. We made minimal assumptions
about GDB settings to make our proposals as general as pos-
sible. However we acknowledge two open issues: (1) It re-
mains an open question whether a passive verifier can pas-
sively establish a DB without knowing the location of (or
distance to) an active one, while perhaps knowing other in-
formation about distances to other nodes. (2) We have not
addressed denial-of-service attacks in group settings (i.e.,
noisy environments). We note though that single prover sin-
gle verifier DB in noisy environments has been addressed in
both the one-way and mutual cases in [13, 22].
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